Posted by Desmond on 26 Jan 2012 in Africa, Blog, Elections, Middle East, Political Risk
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally left office and Yemeni territory for the US and much needed medical treatment on 22 January 2012, following the long drawn out power transition to his deputy Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. In a speech designed for maximum impact, and held on the runway of Sana’a International Airport as he was about to board an aircraft and marking the symbolic end to his thirty-three year rule, Saleh vowed to return to the country for the presidential swearing-in ceremony. Also if reports are to be believed, after he has received treatment to injuries sustained to him in the June 2011 attempt on his life, Saleh is planning to base himself in neighbouring Oman as he plans for his political comeback in opposition. This proposal to pursue politics as an ‘opposition figure’ is likely to keep tensions exacerbated in the lead-up to presidential elections, currently scheduled for 21 February 2012
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Posted by Josephine on 25 Jan 2012 in Africa, Blog, Middle East, Political Risk
In an event that arguably highlights the interim government’s lack of authority in Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) appeared to have lost control of Bani Walid on 24 January 2012, amid reports of a series of attacks by alleged “pro-Gaddafi” forces across several cities, including the capital, Tripoli, and the eastern city of Benghazi. Meanwhile, Bani Walid elders have announced they will begin appointing their own local government, and say they will no longer be dictated to by authorities in Tripoli. It is unclear at time of publication if the attacks across Libya were coordinated. However, one thing is certain: the situation in Libya is far more complicated than simply a case of NTC forces battling Gaddafi loyalists.
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Posted by Josephine on 23 Jan 2012 in Africa, Blog, Military Activity, Political Risk
As Nigeria grapples with the recent devastating attacks from the Islamist militant sect Boko Haram which have left at least 216 people dead, neighbouring West African nations are also left shaken as they struggle to prevent a similar deadly fate from occurring within their own borders. However, for many of these countries, any security measures undertaken to prevent Boko Haram from infiltrating into their territories may be too little too late, as the threat has already made itself known across the region. One such country, Cameroon, has already seen the spectre of Boko Haram emerging in the shadows, and has been the subject of criticism for not only failing to coordinate regional anti-terrorist operations, but, along with Niger, has also been accused of allowing the free movement of Boko Haram militants into long-suffering Nigeria.
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Posted by Spoons on 20 Jan 2012 in Blog, Eastern Europe, Political Risk
Despite denials from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that they are responsible for a bomb attack in the south eastern city of Hakkari, there is little doubt that whoever was responsible for the attack (which bore all the hallmarks of the PKK south eastern insurgency) will have had at least some affiliation to the organisation which has waged an armed conflict against the state since 1984 at the cost of around 40,000 lives. Unfortunately, whilst a tragedy, the impact of the explosion upon both a region and a country, which has become hardened to sporadic and mindless acts of terror will be limited. This latest incidents highlights both the political and military failings in the Turkish Government’s on going response to the “Kurdish issue” and demonstrates the necessity of stepping up efforts for the reinstating of a ceasefire.
The blast which tore through the city centre on the afternoon of 19 January 2012, is believed to have been a hand-made bomb, coincided with the passing of a police car and killed one person leaving a further twenty-seven wounded. Despite their subsequent denial of the attack, the provincial governor of Hakkari, Muammer Turker, has laid the blame firmly at the feet of the PKK. In response to the accusations the PKK issued a statement on 20 January 2012, declaring “our forces have no connection to the bomb attack that killed one Kurdish youngster in Hakkari city centre”. Denial of attacks is nothing new for the PKK, having said that the attack could have been carried out by the Kurdistan Liberation Falcons (TAK), (also known as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks), which has been described as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” organisation by the US Department of State. In one of the most prominent attacks in recent times, on 20 September 2011, TAK claimed responsibility for a car-bomb explosion outside a local state authority’s office in the central Kizilay district of the capital Ankara. The explosion damaged several nearby vehicles and buildings, left three people killed and fifteen injured. They are however, ostensibly aligned with the PKK, and whoever is responsible for the attack they embody the same struggle which the PKK has been fighting for almost three decades.
The PKK is one of the most active terrorist organisations in Turkey. Since it was established in 1984, the insurgency has been responsible for the deaths of more than 40,000 Turkish citizens. During this time the PKK have pursued a two-front strategy, combining a rural insurgency in south-east Turkey with a bombing campaign against civilian targets, including foreign tourists, in the west of the country. They ended a six-month ceasefire in February 2011, and since then have carried out numerous attacks. In particular, PKK activity has increased since July 2011. In a turning point on 17 August 2011, nine Turkish soldiers were killed and fifteen injured in a bomb attack on their convoy in Çukurca, Hakkari province. The attack was widely attributed to the PKK, and prompted the government to send military aircraft to bomb targets in the mountainous Kandil and Zap areas of northern Iraq, where the PKK reportedly operates a number of bases, for the first time in over a year.
The increase in PKK violence can partly be attributed to the lack of momentum for the resumption of negotiations over the “Kurdish issue”. Although the bombardment of PKK positions is though to have lead to the death of around 150 PKK members and reduced the operationally capacity of the outfit, this attack demonstrates that they do still maintain the ability to carry out significant incursions. Also, while this latest military campaign was always likely to lead to retaliatory action this aspect was heightened somewhat by an incident on 29 December 2011, which saw a Turkish air raid conducted along the south-eastern border with Iraq leave at least thirty-five people dead. It transpired, however, that those killed were not militants and were actually Kurdish civilians attempting to smuggle fuel and cigarettes across the border. The incident (accompanied by harrowing images of bodies pilled up and wrapped in carpet) was understandably met with significant outrage in the Kurdish south east. The PKK declared that it was “a crime against humanity” and it sparked clashes between protesters and police in Diyarbakir.
Tragically, it is unlikely that either this latest bomb attack or death of Kurdish civilians will result in a moment of clarity for either side, that military action will only breed resentment and terrorism will further resolve. Neither of which will result in a satisfactory conclusion to the increasing perplexing “Kurdish Issue”. Despite initial optimism due Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government’s original emphasis on attempting to undertake a “democratic opening” process, transgressions by both have effectively scuppered the negotiation process for the foreseeable future. How long it will be until relations once again reach a level where the process can begin again is difficult to assess. What is clear, nevertheless, is that negotiations are undoubtedly the only way that the violent insurgency will end. Additionally, when talks resume it would be sensible, as previously attempted, for Erdogan to focus on dialogue with “moderate”, democratic Kurdish groups. There is however, an inherent tension in attempting to strike a balance between extending Kurdish recognition and cultural identity in the face of ongoing PKK attacks. Of paramount importance therefore is a concerted effort by Erdogan to attempt to oversee the reinstating of a ceasefire which will be the essential first step on the long road to peace.
(Photo Credit: World Bulletin)
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Posted by Desmond on 20 Jan 2012 in Blog, Elections, Middle East, Political Risk
Results for the third stage of the lower house of parliament elections are due to be announced on 21 January 2012, with the first stage of Upper House elections set to begin on 29 January 2012. As a result of the overwhelming endorsement of the Freedom and Justice Party’s (FJP) Islamist agenda in the first two stages the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) will in effect control close to half the seats in the new Egyptian parliament. According to a projection posted by the group on 13 January 2012, the few remaining seats will be parcelled out among liberals, independents, politicians formerly linked to the Mubarak era, and other groups including those which played a role in triggering the revolt against Mubarak. Results of the third round of voting are expected to mirror this trend, which would give both the FJP and al-Nour a combined majority in parliament. Al-Nour’s role will depend on a political relationship with the FJP especially as the FJP previously insisted that would not form a coalition with al-Nour, and that the FJP in the ascendency). On 16 January 2012, the FJP claimed that Egyptian political parties will back proposing its Secretary-General Mohamed al-Katatni for the assembly’s speaker with the two deputy speaker posts going to al-Nour Party, runners up in the vote, and the liberal Wafd Party, one of the next biggest groups; an immediate move to placate al-Nour ahead of parliament gathering for its first session on 23 January 2012. However, in an interesting development, which could show a direct correlation to each other’s interests in the future of Egypt, a leading member of the MB has claimed that the FJP would accept that members of the ruling military council be granted immunity from legal or criminal liability to guarantee a peaceful handover of power and avoid “trouble” in the sense of escalation in violence and instability. Although the official was quick to add that the MB were not advocating such a scenario, but if other political forces were in agreement, they would support the idea including compensating the families of the martyrs. The controversial statement has already led to more accusations of cosying up to the ruling military council in order for a future FJP led parliament to secure military backing. Looking ahead to the future make-up of the Egyptian parliament, the FJP will need to balance the interests of the SCAF with those of the Salafists. Its relationship with al-Nour is key especially as the MB and the Egyptian Salafists represent different segments of Egyptian society and are historical rivals. Despite these tensions, the FJP may find it beneficial to come to a political middle ground with the Salafists, offering al-Nour political concessions.
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Posted by Desmond on 16 Jan 2012 in Blog, Middle East, Military Activity, Political Risk
If 2011 was the year of the Arab Spring and wider MENA unrest then perhaps, following the past few weeks of increased rhetoric between Washington and Tehran, the war drums are now sounding for the Middle East in 2012. If some assessments are to be believed, conflict is inevitable following Iran testing missiles, exercising its navy, and issuing a sharp warning cautioning the US against moving an aircraft carrier into the Persian Gulf. Despite this rebuke, the US has made clear operations will continue in the international waterway, dispatching a second US aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, into the Gulf days later. Iran then threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil flows. It seems that this, coupled with an admission from Tehran that it plans to start uranium enrichment in the “near future” at the Fordow underground site, which is located in a highly-protected bunker beneath a mountain close to the Iranian holy city of Qom, could prove to be the final straw for many in the West. Yet does it signify that a military conflict is inevitable?
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Posted by Spoons on 16 Jan 2012 in Blog, Eastern Europe, Elections, Political Risk
The Romanian Government has called an emergency meeting following four days of unrest, the worst in around twenty years, and which some analysts are predicting could bring down the current Government. Although the largest and most violent protests have been concentrated in the capital Bucharest, actions are believed to have been staged in around forty towns in the country, prompting fears that the Government’s perceived inability in solving Romania’s festering economic crisis could gain enough support to have a significant impact on the form of the current government.
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Posted by Josephine on 16 Jan 2012 in Africa, Blog, Political Risk
Between likening himself to Queen Elizabeth and claiming that all Libyans love him except those given “hallucinogenic drugs by al Qaeda”, former Libyan bogeyman Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was not known for his particularly insightful or inspirational speeches. However, perhaps because even a madman who made thousands of sometimes four-hour-long addresses was bound to get something right, or more accurately, perhaps because the former dictator himself may have played a considerable role in Nigeria’s conflict, Gaddafi may have been accurate about the oil-rich country’s future.
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Posted by Desmond on 13 Jan 2012 in Blog, Elections, Middle East, Military Activity, Political Risk
The southern Philippines has long been a breeding ground for terrorist activity primarily linked to kidnap for ransom with militant organisations like the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) operating in the Sulu archipelago and easternmost island of Mindanao, where a rugged terrain, weak rule of law, sense of grievance among the country’s Muslim minority, and poverty make it difficult for the government to root them out. In recent years, some regional governments, particularly the Philippine Government, has made significant progress in combating terrorism, due in part to counterterrorism aid provided by the US, however, experts are concerned by what appears to be increasing cooperation among the Abu Sayyaf Group, several major MILF commands, and elements of the Southeast Asian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Counterterrorism progress in the region remains difficult, and the Philippines remains vulnerable to penetration by extremist networks like al Qaeda, as a result the question posed here is whether South East Asia is becoming the new terrorist safe haven following the purging of al Qaeda form Afghanistan, Pakistan border areas, the Maghreb and from training camps in Yemen.
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Posted by Spoons on 12 Jan 2012 in Blog, Eastern Europe, Military Activity, Political Risk
Highlighting Moscow’s continuing efforts to try and pacify the North Caucasus, an assault carried out by Russian troops on a rebel camp located in Chechnya’s heavily forested mountains has resulted in the death of four Russian soldiers and at least three Islamist militants. Despite much of the militant insurgency previously based in Chechnya shifting to other parts of the North Caucasus region and in particular Dagestan, there are still active elements to be found in the territory which has been a long-running thorn in Russia’s side. However, Chechen President and Kremlin puppet Ramzan Kadyrov recently claimed in an interview on Chechen television that there “may be no more than fifty” militants still active in the country, a figure he claimed was supported both by operational information and those militants recently captured. Regardless of the validity of these claims, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the North Caucasus, once the backbone of Putin’s power, are now increasingly becoming a source of growing frustration, both in the Kremlin and with the Russian people.
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Posted by Desmond on 9 Jan 2012 in Blog, East Asia, Military Activity, Political Risk, South Asia
The surprise “special broadcast” on North Korean television on 18 December 2011, declaring the death of North Korea’s sixty-nine-year-old ‘Dear Leader’ Kim Jong Il continues to reverberate both throughout the Korean peninsula and regionally. Despite condolences from Pyongyang’s few allies, such as China, and some positive statements being issued from Washington and Seoul as to the future for dialogue with the new government under his son Kim Jong Un, the political and military situation in the country remains in flux and it indeed seems that North Korea will shift towards collective rule from a strongman dictatorship to a ruling coterie withhis untested young son at the head. However, it is likely that it will either be the army or other strong family-linked political figures rather than Kim Jong Un who will pull the strings in the near future. And that any resultant military drills, weapons tests, or ramping up of its nuclear programme will be tantamount to that.
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Posted by Spoons on 6 Jan 2012 in Blog, Military Activity, Political Risk, South Asia
In what, on the face of it, appears to be a worrying development in the fight against militancy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has been revealed that following two meetings held between the leaders of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda and two Pakistani militant groups; at a five-member commission has been formed between the groups which will become known as the Shura Muraqba. The raison d’être of this new coalition is to coordinate efforts of all the militant organisations operating under these various banners against the US led troops in Afghanistan. Additionally, in order to create this new united front all groups involved, particularly those in Pakistan, have vowed to stop targeting local security forces, end suicide attacks and cease their kidnap-for-ransom activities, especially in the militancy-rife tribal regions on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. If successful, there are fears that this new found cooperation, something rarely witnessed between various militant organisations, could pose a significantly increased threat to the forces operating in Afghanistan. Conversely, it could be suggested that the groups pledge to end all other activities with both regions and in particular, kidnap-for-ransom activities in the lawless tribal regions, could have a positive impact in reducing kidnap rates. However, despite this initial analysis it appears that, due to a confluence of factors, this latest announcement is unlikely to have either of the above implications.
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