In what may be one of the strongest signs of the deteriorating human rights situation in Uzbekistan, the country’s government forced the closure of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) office in the country this week. In response to its first ever ‘eviction’ from a country, the HRW said that it will “not be silenced” and expressed its commitment to continue its activity despite the government’s apparent unwillingness to tolerate any criticism of its poor human rights record, particularly when it comes to suppression of the opposition and child labour. Evidence of the government’s human rights relations is, sadly, abundant and does not end with the horrors of the Andijan massacre: in early 2011, the independent group Human Rights Defenders contended that there have been at least thirty-nine torture-related deaths in Uzbekistan jails during 2010, due to the growing crackdown on religious groups and government critics.
As we wrote in this week’s Political Risk and Global Review, the expulsion of HRW, which has in fact been variously harassed by the Uzbek authorities and prevented from carrying out overt monitoring of abuses since 2004, was accompanied by a series of other deeply disturbing developments. On 14 March 2011, a major Russian telecoms operator reported that the Uzbek government ordered them to monitor all sms (text) messages sent by the clients, passing any information deemed “suspicious” to the security services. The operators were also notified that they may be required to switch off the services at the first request of the government, else risk expulsion from the country. And given the history of the Uzbek government’s experience in censorship, there is little doubt that these warnings are going to be taken seriously.
Telephones are not the only media that are facing increased scrutiny of the government: the decrees on media censorship in the country are coming thick and fast. On 04 March 2011, members of local FM radio stations were ordered to limit their contact with all foreign diplomats and embassies and seek express permission from the Uzbek National Association of Electronic Distribution of Mass Information to engage in any joint projects. This not only refers to publication of material that carries input from foreign officials or foreign press (which has, of course, been heavily censored for decades), but also to activity such as participation in any press conferences (even those concerning topics that have nothing to do with political and economic issues facing the country). Any journalists travelling outside the country using the funds of international organisations and diplomatic funds will also be required to report to the authorities.
As we have previously written, Uzbekistan is currently experiencing considerable social and economic problems, and hence a shift towards censorship is not altogether surprising. It is also of note that more than one analytical publication links these developments to the ‘multiplier’ effect social media yielded onto in the revolutions recently observed in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa: alarm bells appear to be ringing loud and clear in the Uzbek corridors of power. Further government restrictions on the civil society are likely. Unfortunately, it does not look like this developing situation is being addressed by the international community and the departure of the few remaining independent observers (such as the HRW) amid greater censorship is an extremely negative sign.
The HRW has been extremely critical of the way in which the international community deals with the increasingly despotic Uzbek government; only last month the heads of the European Union and NATO were forced to defend their decision to hold meetings with the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, in Brussels. It simultaneously released a report, which in no uncertain terms criticised the EU and UN for being “too soft” on oppressive regimes. “Cowardly”, “obsequious” and “meaningless” were some of the words used by the report.
The current trends prevailing in Uzbekistan are extremely negative and increased restrictions on the freedom of information do not only impact on the risk of widespread social protest, such as currently observed in the Middle East or that which took place in the Kyrgyzstan last spring, but they also matter in the short term for both international businesses operating in the country and foreign travellers. Given the restrictions on the journalists’ contact with the international community and the emergence of citizen journalism (which the Uzbek security services appear to see as a threat that they are prepared to monitor via the telecoms companies), all foreign visitors may suddenly find themselves being investigated by the Uzbek security services for simply talking to a native stranger.
Being prepared for such eventualities and knowing the guidelines for the equipment which is permitted in restrictive countries such as Uzbekistan is more than a useful precaution. It could determine the way in which an individual or a business is treated by security services that enjoy virtual immunity. Below is an example of the IT and Telecoms Equipment Review produced by the Inkerman Group in September 2010. To receive an updated version of the document, or similar reviews on other countries, please contact alice.boyes@inkerman.com.
The reports feature information on:
EQUIPMENT CONFISCATION; DATA COPYING; DATA SCANNING; USE OF ENCRYPTION; SATELLITE COMMS; MOBILE TELEPHONY; AES/FIPS; 256Bit; Virtual Private Network; RSA 128Bit RC-5; Email encryption (SHA1/3DES)
