On 07 October 2011, the world reluctantly marked the tenth anniversary of the war in Afghanistan, as concerns persist over the prospects for “lasting” security for the Afghan people once ISAF forces withdraw in 2014. Reflecting on the challenges facing the country, on 06 October 2011, retired US Army General Stanley McChrystal, who commanded coalition forces in the country in 2009 – 2010 (before being controversially forced to resign following a magazine article in which it was considered that he had criticised President Barack Obama), said in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations: “We didn’t know enough and we still don’t know enough…Most of us — me included — had a very superficial understanding of the situation and history, and we had a frighteningly simplistic view of recent history, the last 50 years.” McChrystal noted that of the remaining tasks to be accomplished in the country, the most difficult may be to create a legitimate government that ordinary Afghans can believe in and that can serve as a counterweight to the Taliban.
Here we look at the current situation in Afghanistan, reflecting on changing Taliban tactics in response to ongoing ISAF operations, and highlighting that while the ISAF is making some progress, the Taliban is proving itself to be a resilient enemy. Of particular concern is the view that, while an opportunity may be being created, the country is not in a position to capitalise upon this because the government is yet to inspire the confidence of the people.
As the summer fighting period draws to a close, NATO has revealed a levelling off of insurgent initiated attack, as assaults on coalition forces dropped 20% in the first half of 2011 compared to 2010. These figures are being perceived as representative of a weakening of Taliban forces in the country and that, having lost significant man power, it is now forced to rely increasingly on IED attacks which do not risk its own forces. Demonstrating the changing face of the war in Afghanistan, the latest Pentagon report released in early September 2011 disclosed that insurgents in the country planted more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during the summer of 2011 than at any time since the ten-year war in the country began. Insurgents planted 4,472 of the bombs from May through July 2011, a 17% increase compared with the same three months in 2010.
IEDs are the single largest cause of casualties among ISAF forces, however, such attacks also cause horrific casualties among Afghan civilians, meaning the strategy may serve to further alienate the people. Furthermore, ISAF forces have become increasingly adept at detecting such devices, thereby limiting their effectiveness. Of the IEDs planted in May-July 2011, troops found 2,049 of them before they exploded, a 40% increase. Whilst this change in tactic may be representative of a weakening enemy (following successful operations by ISAF forces swelled by troops from the surge of US forces), it is also, however, a sign of a resilient force which remains relatively well supplied.
In parallel to the increasing use of IEDs, the recent assassinations in the country appear representative of the fact that the insurgents are changing their tactics from actively engaging ISAF forces on the battle field, and are relying on individual attacks on high profile individuals in their efforts to continue their campaign of intimidation. On 20 September 2011, the head of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, and the country’s former president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was killed alongside four other members of the Council, in a suicide bomb attack at his home, which is located in Kabul’s upmarket Wazir Akhbar Khan district, close to the American embassy. Rabbani, who was a former Mujahideen leader who was widely respected across the country for his central role in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, served as president from 1992, when the Soviets withdrew from the country, until he was ousted by the Taliban in 1996. Due to his history he was arguably in a unique position to garner support from the Afghan people, and his death is widely viewed as a significant blow to the peace process given that there are few potential replacements with his gravitas.
Whilst the use of such targeted actions may be indicative of a smaller insurgent forces, this does not mean that such attacks are not highly effective. These assassinations require minimal manpower, but have maximum impact as they serve to undermine the governing structure, giving the impression that nobody in the country is immune from the violence. Furthermore, such attacks are arguably indicative of an increasing “professionalism” among insurgents.
Even if the militants have, as is increasingly being asserted, been significantly weakened, it remains a deadly insurgency which continues to pose a significant threat both to coalition forces and to Afghan civilians. The death of Rabbani, coming just days after a series of coordinated attacks in Kabul targeting NATO’s headquarters, the US embassy, and the Afghan intelligence agency (attacks which also involved the use of small numbers of insurgents to maximum effect), is serving to further undermine efforts to convince the Afghan people that there is a realistic prospect of “lasting security” in the country once ISAF forces are withdrawn. Concern also continues to mount over the operations of the Haqqani Network and its influence on other groups, particularly those with ties to Pakistan.
ISAF forces are attempting to create an environment in which the Afghan government can thrive. There are concerns however, that this strategy will not work, not because of a failing on the part of ISAF, but because of a failure of governance. The Afghan people appear ultimately to be concerned about enduring security, after which they prioritise jobs, education, health care and access to resources such as water. However, faith in the Afghan Government at a national level is very low, as President Hamid Karzai and the national government have thus far failed to demonstrate that they are able to deliver lasting security or to tackle corruption. Any further revelations of significant failings by the President or his government have the potential to push the people into support for the Taliban, or at the very least, make them disengage further from the reconstruction effort.
(Image: Tim Hetherington)
