Highlighting Moscow’s continuing efforts to try and pacify the North Caucasus, an assault carried out by Russian troops on a rebel camp located in Chechnya’s heavily forested mountains has resulted in the death of four Russian soldiers and at least three Islamist militants. Despite much of the militant insurgency previously based in Chechnya shifting to other parts of the North Caucasus region and in particular Dagestan, there are still active elements to be found in the territory which has been a long-running thorn in Russia’s side. However, Chechen President and Kremlin puppet Ramzan Kadyrov recently claimed in an interview on Chechen television that there “may be no more than fifty” militants still active in the country, a figure he claimed was supported both by operational information and those militants recently captured. Regardless of the validity of these claims, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the North Caucasus, once the backbone of Putin’s power, are now increasingly becoming a source of growing frustration, both in the Kremlin and with the Russian people.
According to official reports the confrontation in Chechnya’s Vedenskiy district began on 08 January 2012, when Russian security forces came across the camp, which unbeknown to them, had been fortified by militants who had laid trip wires and mines which had become buried under deep snow around their hideout. It appears that the security forces that were killed fell foul to their booby trapped surroundings, which also contributed significantly to the injury of around sixteen further servicemen. Following the incident, Kadyrov declared that Russian operations in the region were close to achieving their objective: “we have practically found their den and we are now doing everything we can to destroy them in their den”.
Although Russia officially ended its counter-terrorism operations in Chechnya in April 2009, Russia’s North Caucasus region has continued to witness similar violent incidents in recent years. The continuing insurgency in the North Caucasus displays how ineffective Moscow’s response to this unsettled region has been, an issue which will no doubt be thrown into even sharper focus with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s bid for presidency in 2012. There is suspicion that in the run-up to the election as he has done previously, Putin will attempt to use the unrest in the region to his advantage as a means of justifying his unique style of leadership, not only re-enforcing his “tough man” image but also gathering popular support. Much has changed however since Putin last employed this tactic.
There a growing group of Russians who have openly displayed their satisfaction with the Putin regime, most notably, following the widely criticised December 2011 Duma elections, but also in regards to Russian policy in the North Caucasus. It has been suggested that there are a growing number of Russians who believe that the current policy of funding the region’s corrupt authoritarian leaders, such as Kadyrov, in exchange for undying loyalty and support for Putin (in the December 2011 Duma elections United Russia received 99.48% of the Chechen vote), may now need to change. Of particular outrage to many are the significant sums of money which Putin insists on sending to the region in order to preserve his Kremlin allies. This factor has become increasingly difficult for the Russian public to swallow, especially in light of the economic shifts in Russia, resulting in particular from the on going Eurozone crisis.
Despite a growing feeling that Moscow’s policy in the North Caucasus would benefit from a fresh approach, there is little consensus as to how this should be achieved. Testament to the complex and multi-faceted nature of how to begin to contain militancy in the region and stabilise the political situation. There is significant evidence that the growth of militancy, particularly in Dagestan and Ingushetia, has been fuelled by a confluence of factors. At the root of the problem appears to be the dire economic conditions in which many residents find themselves, especially the younger generation. This discontent is compounded by the relative impunity with which Russian security forces operate under in the region, carrying out arbitrary attacks on residents, and consequently, pushing many into the hands of the militants due to a belief that they have no choice but to “go into the forest”.
It appears therefore, that rather than once again resorting to the iron fist approach, Putin may be better advised attempting to tackle insurgency at its source, in order to appease both the militants themselves and the detracting voices with Russia. This will however being a complex and arduous task, and unfortunately, Putin is unlikely to easily give up on a policy which has been so instrumental in creating and sustaining his power base. Putin is however acutely aware of the growing distain for the financial and political support he offers to the North Caucasus: at a recent speech whilst visiting Chechnya, he rejected the idea of cutting off the region from Russian support due to its financial burdensome nature and described the arguments for this policy as “wild”. Despite this assertion, Putin could muster little more in defence of this policy than an argument of containment, pointing out that an end to support could lead to large scale migration of the region’s population to other regions of Russia, something which he believes would create new problems. This somewhat lacklustre response highlights that Putin himself may be unsure as how best to approach the issue, especially in light of the upcoming election and growing displays of discontent. What is clear though is that Putin would be foolish to resort to the temptation to fight a short sharp war, which despite its success in the past is unlikely to yield support from a increasingly discerning and influential Russian generation.
