The southern Philippines has long been a breeding ground for terrorist activity primarily linked to kidnap for ransom with militant organisations like the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) operating in the Sulu archipelago and easternmost island of Mindanao, where a rugged terrain, weak rule of law, sense of grievance among the country’s Muslim minority, and poverty make it difficult for the government to root them out. In recent years, some regional governments, particularly the Philippine Government, has made significant progress in combating terrorism, due in part to counterterrorism aid provided by the US, however, experts are concerned by what appears to be increasing cooperation among the Abu Sayyaf Group, several major MILF commands, and elements of the Southeast Asian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Counterterrorism progress in the region remains difficult, and the Philippines remains vulnerable to penetration by extremist networks like al Qaeda, as a result the question posed here is whether South East Asia is becoming the new terrorist safe haven following the purging of al Qaeda form Afghanistan, Pakistan border areas, the Maghreb and from training camps in Yemen.
Philippine President Benigno Aquino III warned of a possible radical Islamist attack in the capital Manila ahead of the religious procession marking the Roman Catholic Feast of Black Nazarene on 09 January 2012. Although more than 4,000 police officers were deployed to the city, whilst a number of crowd restrictions have been announced in an effort to combat any impeding attacks, the event passed without a significant security incident. Before the event officials asked those attending the procession in the Quiapo district, not to bring mobile phones or weapons of any kind. Additionally authorities said that all firecrackers, which are traditionally lit during the religious event, would be banned and those found to have such items will be arrested. The measures come after Aquino announced at a news conference on 08 January 2012, that several terrorists planning to disrupt the religious procession had been sighted in the capital. Although there is a “heightened risk” of an attack, Aquino acknowledged that the threat was not high enough to outright cancel the day-long religious event.
In general South-East Asian governments continue to manage home-grown extremism reasonably well, but the problem is not going away. In November 2011, a man calling himself Abu Jihad Khalil al-Rahman al-Luzoni posted a video in Arabic on YouTube asking for support. Many believe he is in fact Khalil Pareja, a former prisoner and leader of the Indonesian based Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM). The RSM of Christian converts to Islam organisation was formed in 2002 and there is increasing evidence of links with the Abu Sayyaf. The alliance with the RSM has increased the Abu Sayyaf’s ability to stage terrorist attacks outside its southern strongholds and there is evidence to suggest that the February 2004 sinking of Superferry 14 in Manila Bay, which killed 116 people, was ordered by the Abu Sayyaf but carried out by RSM members. The security forces arrested the group’s founder, Ahmed Islam Santos, in October 2005 during a raid on his hideout in Zamboanga. However, if Khalil is indeed making a return to campaign in the Philippines, looking for funds and recruits, it could mean that Manila will see more systematic jihadi activity in the short term.
Indonesia used to have one major terror attack a year – in 2011, there were seven separate plots, of which five ended in violence, although the efforts were amateurish and the casualty rate was low. Already indicators suggest that terror cells are keen to embark on a campaign of terror against Indonesian Government targets and challenge the perceived iron grip of President Yudhoyono in 2012. On 03 January 2012, only five days after Indonesian authorities placed seven prominent cities, including the capital Jakarta, on terror alert in anticipation of possible incidents during the festive period, the Indonesian counter-terrorism unit Densus 88 arrested three suspected terrorists in the city of Semarang, the capital of Central Java province on 22 December 2011, after they claimed the men planned to carry out an attack against a church on Christmas Eve. The arrests underscore the persistent threat of terrorist activity in the country, which is usually heightened between 25 December and 01 January since the 2002 Bali Bombings, and remain an attractive target for extremist strikes. While counter-terrorism operations have successfully curbed the capacity of large militant networks, such as the al Qaeda affiliated JI, (on 16 June 2011, JI head and Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir was sentenced to fifteen years in prison after being found guilty of committing militancy, whilst the head of the country’s anti-terrorism unit continues to claim police have killed or captured a string 455 militants since 2000, including Southeast Asia’s most-wanted fugitive, Noordin Mohammad Top, since July 2009), in recent months however, small self-trained cells that appear to be acting independently maintain their presence throughout the sprawling peninsula. In June 2010, intelligence emerged indicating that militants in Aceh Besar regency were pioneering a militant movement in Aceh and had undergone basic training, including weapons training, in Aceh and on the main Indonesian island of Java. An active militant group in Aceh with transnational goals would be something the US would be eager to contain, given Aceh’s strategic geographic location near the Malacca strait. Whilst two terror plots were foiled in March 2011 after militants sent books containing explosives to several selected government targets.
Several factors could affect the development of terrorism in Indonesia over the coming year: the increasingly frequent alliance, particularly in Indonesia, between jihadists armed with bombs or guns, and anti-vice or anti-apostasy militants, who in the past have preferred rocks and sticks; the coming of age of younger siblings of slain or detained terrorist suspects; revival of the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM) under another name in the Philippines; and possibly, fallout from the Arab Spring, particularly in Yemen. Indonesia remains the stronghold of extremism in the region, by virtue of its size, openness and lack of consensus among the moderate majority about the nature of the threat. As larger jihadi organisations like JI have fragmented, new groups have emerged without the trained leadership or lengthy recruitment and indoctrination process that characterised the old ones. Since 2010, the focus of Indonesian terrorists has been overwhelmingly on domestic targets, however this is now broadening as Indonesians studying in Pakistan or Yemen are being recruited by extremists, and are seeking to return home committed to the global jihad. New militants could also emerge from the remnants of terrorist leader Noordin Top’s group – particularly younger siblings of those arrested or killed after the second Bali bombing in 2005 or the twin hotel bombings in Jakarta in 2009.
Indonesia has another dimension, of course. It is the largest Muslim country in the world, and one that has harboured and defeated a significant jihadist terrorist group. As al Qaeda crumbles, the jihadist movement may endure. The United States has an ongoing interest in this war and therefore has an interest in Indonesian stability and its ability to suppress radical Islam inside its borders and, above all, prevent the emergence of an Indonesian-based al Qaeda with an intercontinental capability. In June 2010, intelligence emerged indicating that militants in Aceh Besar regency were pioneering a militant movement in Aceh and had undergone basic training, including weapons training, in Aceh and on the main Indonesian island of Java. An active militant group in Aceh with transnational goals would be something the US would be eager to contain, given Aceh’s strategic geographic location near the Malacca strait.
Continued vigilance and improved regional cooperation between security agencies is required looking ahead as was witnessed in both July 2011 and November 2011, when police in Indonesia and Malaysia arrested thirty members of an organisation known as the Abu Umar group. This group’s reach extended through Jakarta, Sulawesi and East Kalimantan in Indonesia to Sabah in Malaysia and Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga and Jolo in the Philippines, and its full extent remains under investigation. Its existence underscores how much the terrorism problem transcends national boundaries and how much law enforcement officials in the region need to learn from one another, but it also underscores how easy recruitment into violent groups continues to be and how much more effort needs to be put into strengthening community resistance to extremist doctrine. The problem, at least in Indonesia, is that no one can agree where the threat is coming from, and fear of stigmatising Islam remains high. The result is political paralysis on counter-radicalisation efforts, despite good law enforcement. Many Muslim leaders at the district level remain convinced that the terrorism issue is a plot by the police to divert attention from corruption scandals and keep the counter-terrorism funds flowing. Until the region’s largest country can come to grips with the issue domestically, broader regional efforts will be hampered.
