Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally left office and Yemeni territory for the US and much needed medical treatment on 22 January 2012, following the long drawn out power transition to his deputy Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. In a speech designed for maximum impact, and held on the runway of Sana’a International Airport as he was about to board an aircraft and marking the symbolic end to his thirty-three year rule, Saleh vowed to return to the country for the presidential swearing-in ceremony. Also if reports are to be believed, after he has received treatment to injuries sustained to him in the June 2011 attempt on his life, Saleh is planning to base himself in neighbouring Oman as he plans for his political comeback in opposition. This proposal to pursue politics as an ‘opposition figure’ is likely to keep tensions exacerbated in the lead-up to presidential elections, currently scheduled for 21 February 2012
Saleh is perhaps the only winner in this outcome as the settlement was achieved through negotiations and because the opposition did not push things towards the edge and accepted the agreement out of their fear for the country as the Islamist Al-Islah (Reform) Party, the main opposition group during Saleh’s rule rules by leaving the country albeit it temporarily defines the end of Saleh. However, leaving in this manner could signify that Saleh has now finally found himself an honourable exit that might not completely throw him out of politics as he has proved to be a smart tactician, portraying himself as a “saviour” after he signed the GGC deal and only leaving office and the country (for medical treatment) after a law was passed giving him complete immunity from prosecution. Moreover, Saleh remains well connected to the key military apparatus which remains as his sons and relatives remain in the Republican Guard troops which will need to be reshuffled in keeping with the GCC plan, which will be is easier said than done and does not offer them much in return to relinquish their privileged positions in government and in the economy much like how the military is connected in Egypt. Moreover, unlike the dissolution of the NDP in Egypt, Saleh’s GPC party, remains and still holds a majority in parliament so will no doubt still continue to have a say in the country’s political scene in the months ahead through a new leader but as a mouthpiece for Saleh.
Although the political agreement may mark an end to the conflict in Sana’a the Transitional Government will continue to face considerable challenges in its efforts to prepare the country for the polls as the situation in the capital and across large sways of the North and South remain highly volatile and subject to outbreaks of unrest from the secessionist movement in the South, the Houthis in the North and the push by Islamic militants to take a foothold in the anarchic east of the country. In an example of how the fissures in the country are emerging following Saleh’s departure approximately 600 disaffected Yemeni soldiers held a four day demonstration in the capital blockading access to key infrastructure in the centre of including key roads and two runways at Sana’a International Airport Although the airport was secured by loyalist forces on 23 January 2012, and partially reopened but it dramatically affected air transit and perception that the country’s main airport was untouchable during this crisis. Moreover, as the main demand was not met, the removal of air force chief Major General Mohammed Saleh, Saleh’s half brother, from office. The new dynamic of protests by mutinying troops may now add a new element of insecurity on the streets of Yemen as urban centres and other airports may now be targeted in a bid to cause significant disruption and maximise the impact of protests.
The persistence of protests against elements of the Saleh family is reflective of the considerable resentment over the GCC power transfer deal and is likely to continue until a new government is formed without links to Saleh. The opposition parties have agreed to support al-Hadi as the only candidate in the presidential elections but even this looks unlikely following parliament’s recent approval of full immunity from prosecution for Saleh on a perceived “get out of jail free card for thirty years of corrupt rule”.
The man charged with picking up the pieces is Al-Hadi. Al-Hadi’s promotion will become official with presidential elections on 21 February, in which he is the only candidate by consensus between Saleh’s General People’s Congress (of which Al-Hadi is a member) and the opposition bloc, Joint Meeting Parties. Although Saleh remains President until the elections, this face-saving condition of the transition agreement permits Saleh to complete his term rather than resign, the president’s powers are delegated to the vice-president, making Al-Hadi effectively Acting-President as well as President-Elect.
Al- Hadi’s many years in government and national profile, (some may say are his principle strengths) are also his main weaknesses. He will find it difficult to disassociate himself from Saleh or shake suspicions that the spirit of Saleh lives on in him. To his credit, however, Al-Hadi has not strongly courted power. In the present turmoil, when a steady hand is required, Al-Hadi’s apparent lack of ambition might be valuable. He is a reluctant leader and is unwilling to dominate proceedings but happy to be of service, and in important ways, this is a much needed quality in Yemen’s next president. Whether it is enough, is a different question. Yet probably the only thing Yemen needs less than another strong-man dictator is a political vacuum. On this point, all parties agree and this consideration, more than Al-Hadi’s accomplishments or abilities, have propelled him to the top office. Now that he’s there, he will be challenged to maintain cross-party support as well as draw disaffected groups into the transition process. This is especially so as Saleh has left behind a state beset by countless challenges, political, economic, military, developmental, each sufficient to bring about Yemen’s collapse. Given Yemen’s strategic location at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula and the gateway between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, the stakes could hardly be higher.
