Posted by Cassie Blombaum on 15 Apr 2013 in Africa, America, Brazil, Business Risk, Corruption, Energy, Exploration, Latin America, Military Activity, Mining, Political Risk
One adage that often comes to mind when discussing the relationship between Angola and Brazil arises from the legendary words of an old friar by the name of Gonçalo João. According to historical tradition, in 1646 João, a Jesuit missionary, announced quite simply that “there is no Brazil without Angola”. Sadly, however, João was not referencing the “special relationship” in the vein of the purported economic, security and cultural ties described between that of the British and the Americans. João’s words were largely alluding to the horrific trade of human beings, taken from local villages in what is now modern day Angola, and shipped to the South American nation during the Portuguese Empire’s ascension to the Atlantic Slave Trade at the end of the 15th century. To be sure, the abhorrent sale of slaves from Angola became so prolific that at one point, the country was exporting human beings at a rate of “10,000” per year, the vast majority of whom eventually made their way to Portugal’s Brazilian colonies.
Thankfully, in the centuries since, the world and its norms have changed. Slavery is, of course, illegal in both Lucophone nations. Neither Brazil, nor Angola is a colony of Portugal. Indeed, given the influx of Portuguese migrants to both nations, some have even joked that the opposite may be true. Despite such significant developments over the years, the general meaning of João’s statement has not withered away. In fact, by most accounts ties between Angola and Brazil appear to be stronger than ever. Today, both countries have been glowingly labelled by financial wizards as “emerging economies”, with Angola and Brazil each enjoying sustained growth amid a global downturn. Both nations have also struck major security and infrastructure deals, with Brazilian companies in particular investing billions of dollars into developing the Angolan mining sector, among other industries. The two nations are even planning to establish the “South Atlantic Cable System” (as shown above), which, if implemented would speed up data transfers by bypassing Europe altogether.
Meanwhile, in what some might describe as another bit of economic “revenge”, both countries have been buying up shares in languishing Portuguese companies, with Angola infamously purchasing the formerly government-run Banco Português de Negócios for a measly 30 million Euros (US$39 million). It is these and other financial and political manoeuvres that have led their respective leaders to remark on their nations’ “brotherly” relationship. But, as with every ‘brotherly’ relationship, there comes sibling rivalry.
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Posted by Maximilian Hess on 1 Feb 2013 in America, Business Risk, Political Risk, United States
This year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland proved a positive turning point in Western views on the global economic situation but also may prove a bellwether for China’s growing discontent with Western-centric global institutions. The key message at Davos was that Western political and economic leaders are finally convinced that the worst of the financial crisis is behind them. It became the overshadowing message not only because it was such a departure from the forums in the past few years which were heavily laden with a message of doom and gloom, but because of the forums inherent slant towards Eurocentric issues and is composed almost entirely of Western “elites”. Yet it many ways that same slant allowed for the most important ramifications to be brushed off.
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Posted by Cassie Blombaum on 28 Sep 2012 in Africa, America, Business Risk, Kidnap, Libya, Middle East, Political Risk, United States
If ever there was a Libyan city which remains haunted by the ghost of the former dictator Muammar Gaddafi, it is Bani Walid. Located approximately 140 kilometres south-west of its rival, Misrata, the city of roughly 80,000 is still struggling to define a place for itself in post-revolutionary Libya. Often tarnished as a town sympathetic to the former regime, Bani Walid’s residents remain forever anxious that they will face the brunt of revenge attacks from those nearby cities which suffered the full wrath of Gaddafi’s forces. These anxieties are not without warrant. In fact, the longstanding divide between Misrata and Bani Walid appears to be growing ever deeper, leading to fears of a potential eruption of violence. So why such heightened tensions? Although the two cities have suffered a decades-long antagonism with one another, it is the kidnap, torture and later death of Misrata native Imran Juma Shaban allegedly at the hands of a Bani Walid militia, which may have finally pushed Misratans over the edge.
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Posted by Cassie Blombaum on 20 Sep 2012 in America, Business Risk, Libya, Middle East, Political Risk, Revolution, United States
Aside from sporadic reports of attacks against Sufi shrines and the high-profile clashes at Tripoli International Airport in June 2012, in the aftermath of Gaddafi’s death in October 2011, Western media interest in Libya remained dormant as events in Syria and Egypt filled the quota for coverage of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. All of that changed on 11 September 2012, when a group of armed militants, initially believed to have been angered by the recent publication of an American-made anti-Islamic film, attacked the US Consulate in Benghazi, in a horrific event which left popular US Ambassador Chris Stevens, as well as three other American officials, dead. In the aftermath of the attack, a media frenzy ensued, and whilst the circumstances surrounding the assault remain, even today, rather murky, some international investors have expressed understandable alarm, whilst other companies have considered withdrawing from the Maghreb nation altogether. However, as outlined below, it is important to note that these events did not take place in a vacuum.
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Posted by Cassie Blombaum on 7 Sep 2012 in Africa, America, Business Risk, Elections, Libya, Middle East, Political Risk, Revolution, United States
Whilst the international media’s attention appears to be largely focused around the fate of Gaddafi’s notorious senior spy, Abdullah al Senussi, another more contentious issue is raging across the Maghreb nation: the fate of Libya’s fledgling political landscape. Following the announcement of the list of candidates for prime minister on 05 September 2012, which included, among other hopefuls, Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur and National Forces Alliance (NFA) head Mahmoud Jibril, two critical questions remained: Who will win the coveted role of Libyan prime minister (PM)? Or, perhaps, more accurately (albeit, controversially), does anyone actually want to be Libya’s first ‘official’ post-conflict prime minister? Indeed, whoever wins the role will be fighting an uphill battle. Despite vast improvements following the downfall of Gaddafi in 2011, the new PM is expected to tackle Libya’s ever-present problem of security. Hard-line Islamist or “Salafist” attacks remain all too common, whilst the current government remains unable to manage the country’s disorganised security apparatus. Nevertheless, along with Jibril and Abushagur, the embattled Minister of Electricity, Awad Barasi; Dr Mohamed Barween; and lesser known candidates, including: Mohammed Al Mufti, Fathi Al Akkari, Abdulhamid Al Nami and Al Mabrouk Al Zway, all appear (on the surface at least) to be up to the challenge.
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Posted by Cassie Blombaum on 21 Aug 2012 in Africa, America, Business Risk, Cyber Crime, Kenya, Political Risk, Somalia, United States
As Kenyan Defence Forces continue their deadly assault on al Shabaab’s main “cash cow”, the strategic port city of Kismayo, another source of steady alleged terrorist income is facing a battle of its own. Often dubbed the “Western Union” of al Shabaab militants, the Somali-based (but Dubai-headquartered) Dahabshiil Bank is as of 20 August 2012, on the verge of losing its flagship branch in Djibouti. According to outgoing employees, who admittedly, may be biased, the company lacks capital, having been “unable” to muster up a strong clientele base – a rather curious assertion considering that Somalis make up 50% of Djibouti’s population. So is this truly a case of financial mismanagement causing customers to steer away, or is the potential banking failure part of a larger onslaught against Somali-based economic institutions? If the ongoing “hacktivism” campaign against the embattled bank’s websites are any indication, the latter is most likely. Indeed, the Djibouti branch appears by most accounts to be nothing more than collateral damage in Kenya’s, and the US’, ongoing military and cyber war campaign aimed at completely dismantling al Shabaab.
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