Inkerman Insights
Thousands have taken to the streets, protesters have engaged in clashes almost daily with national security forces, whilst disenchanted youths continue to call for an aging leader who has been in power for more than twelve years to step down. This is not a flashback to the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings of 2011. This is Senegal, in the days leading up to the hotly contested 2012 presidential elections.
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Thousands of people took to the streets in cities across Libya, waving their arms, shouting and singing as fireworks blasted in the skies. Gone were the monochromatic green flags of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, instead, in the hands of most citizens, were the red, black and green colours of post-Gaddafi Libya. The bold new tri-coloured flag, which features a white crescent moon and star in the centre, is, in effect, the symbol of a bold, new Libya. Only one year after the bogeyman himself, the now deceased Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, initiated a bloody crackdown against his own people which left more than 200 dead in a single day in Benghazi on 20 February 2012, Libyans are now enjoying something they have not experienced in nearly half a century: freedom.
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President Bashar al-Assad declared that a referendum will take place in Syria on 26 February 2012, on a draft constitution aimed at establishing political pluralism challenging the Article 8 principle which enshrines his Baath party’s dominant role. The new referendum move is unlikely to appease the movement against him, which began with street demonstrations by civilians but now includes an armed insurrection by the Free Syrian Army made up mainly of army defectors. While constitution amendments were a key opposition demand, most opposition groups say they will now only accept the resignation of President Assad. Moreover, as the levels of violence have intensified it appears that this apparent concession is aimed at appeasing certain elements of the international community that Syria is able to govern its own affairs, ticking Russian and Chinese boxes over non-interference and against implementing any further sanctions. It appears that at this stage of the eleven month crackdown, al-Assad is seeking to offer insubstantial compromises rather than agreeing to dismantle his fifty-year old police state dominated by members of his Alawite sect that keeps him in power. Moreover, it seems improbable that al-Assad will ever be able to govern a united Syria in the future after bombarding his own cities and towns. He is escalating the use of his military might either to sink Syria into chaos or to improve his negotiating position. Militarily he cannot win.
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Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally left office and Yemeni territory for the US and much needed medical treatment on 22 January 2012, following the long drawn out power transition to his deputy Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. In a speech designed for maximum impact, and held on the runway of Sana’a International Airport as he was about to board an aircraft and marking the symbolic end to his thirty-three year rule, Saleh vowed to return to the country for the presidential swearing-in ceremony. Also if reports are to be believed, after he has received treatment to injuries sustained to him in the June 2011 attempt on his life, Saleh is planning to base himself in neighbouring Oman as he plans for his political comeback in opposition. This proposal to pursue politics as an ‘opposition figure’ is likely to keep tensions exacerbated in the lead-up to presidential elections, currently scheduled for 21 February 2012
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In an event that arguably highlights the interim government’s lack of authority in Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) appeared to have lost control of Bani Walid on 24 January 2012, amid reports of a series of attacks by alleged “pro-Gaddafi” forces across several cities, including the capital, Tripoli, and the eastern city of Benghazi. Meanwhile, Bani Walid elders have announced they will begin appointing their own local government, and say they will no longer be dictated to by authorities in Tripoli. It is unclear at time of publication if the attacks across Libya were coordinated. However, one thing is certain: the situation in Libya is far more complicated than simply a case of NTC forces battling Gaddafi loyalists.
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Results for the third stage of the lower house of parliament elections are due to be announced on 21 January 2012, with the first stage of Upper House elections set to begin on 29 January 2012. As a result of the overwhelming endorsement of the Freedom and Justice Party’s (FJP) Islamist agenda in the first two stages the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) will in effect control close to half the seats in the new Egyptian parliament. According to a projection posted by the group on 13 January 2012, the few remaining seats will be parcelled out among liberals, independents, politicians formerly linked to the Mubarak era, and other groups including those which played a role in triggering the revolt against Mubarak. Results of the third round of voting are expected to mirror this trend, which would give both the FJP and al-Nour a combined majority in parliament. Al-Nour’s role will depend on a political relationship with the FJP especially as the FJP previously insisted that would not form a coalition with al-Nour, and that the FJP in the ascendency). On 16 January 2012, the FJP claimed that Egyptian political parties will back proposing its Secretary-General Mohamed al-Katatni for the assembly’s speaker with the two deputy speaker posts going to al-Nour Party, runners up in the vote, and the liberal Wafd Party, one of the next biggest groups; an immediate move to placate al-Nour ahead of parliament gathering for its first session on 23 January 2012. However, in an interesting development, which could show a direct correlation to each other’s interests in the future of Egypt, a leading member of the MB has claimed that the FJP would accept that members of the ruling military council be granted immunity from legal or criminal liability to guarantee a peaceful handover of power and avoid “trouble” in the sense of escalation in violence and instability. Although the official was quick to add that the MB were not advocating such a scenario, but if other political forces were in agreement, they would support the idea including compensating the families of the martyrs. The controversial statement has already led to more accusations of cosying up to the ruling military council in order for a future FJP led parliament to secure military backing. Looking ahead to the future make-up of the Egyptian parliament, the FJP will need to balance the interests of the SCAF with those of the Salafists. Its relationship with al-Nour is key especially as the MB and the Egyptian Salafists represent different segments of Egyptian society and are historical rivals. Despite these tensions, the FJP may find it beneficial to come to a political middle ground with the Salafists, offering al-Nour political concessions.
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